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Abstract
Negative reciprocity and retrenched pension rights
We document the importance of negatively reciprocal inclinations in labor relationships 
by showing that a retrenchment of pension rights, which is perceived as unfair, 
causes a larger reduction in job motivation the stronger workers’ negatively reciprocal 
inclinations are. We exploit unique matched survey and administrative data on male 
employees in the public sector in the Netherlands and compare the job motivation of 
employees born in 1950, who faced a substantial retrenchment of their pension rights 
resulting from a pension reform in 2006, to that of slightly older employees who remain 
entitled to more generous pension benefits. Job motivation is significantly lower among 
negatively reciprocal employees who were affected by the reform. The negative effect 
on job motivation is greater for negative reciprocal employees born very shortly after 
the cut-off date of January 1, 1950, as well as for those with many untreated colleagues, 
and who therefore arguably perceive the policy change as being more unfair. We also 
find that the treatment effect is stronger among workers who are more likely to hold 
their employer accountable for the drop in their pension rights, that is, those who work 
for the national government.
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1 Introduction
Experimental economists and psychologists have provided ample evidence from controlled
laboratory studies that reciprocity is a key driver of human motivation (Bowles, 2008).1
Theory predicts that reciprocity also aects labor market outcomes (e.g., Akerlof, 1982;
Rabin, 1993). Important implications are, for example, that positively reciprocal em-
ployees increase their eorts above the required level when treated generously by their
employers and that negatively reciprocal workers retaliate against their employers for
unfair treatment, for example, by reducing eort.
Previous empirical work on the role of reciprocity in employment relationships focused
largely on the impact of positive reciprocity on workers' eort response in gift exchanges.
Convincing evidence of in-kind response by workers (i.e., higher eort provision) to the
friendly actions of employers (i.e., a higher wage payment) has been found in stylized
labor markets in laboratory experiments (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1998; Brown
et al., 2004).2 Evidence from eld experiments is somewhat less conclusive. Despite the
overwhelming evidence of reference-dependent fairness concerns (e.g. Fehr et al., 1993;
Fehr et al., 2009), researchers still debate on the extent to which employers' generous
treatment of workers cause increased eort provision.3 Some complementary correlational
evidence for the relevance of gift exchange in actual labor markets has been provided
1Numerous studies have shown that individuals reciprocate trust in trust games (Berg et al., 1995).
Moreover, it has been documented that individuals (in bargaining games) are willing to reject unfair
oers, even at personal cost (e.g., Guth et al., 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995), and those who participate
in public good games are prepared to punish deviations from average or individual contributions (e.g.
Fehr and Gachter, 2000)
2Several eld experiments in non-labor market contexts (e.g.; Falk, 2007; Falk and Zehnder, 2007)
have recently shown that reciprocal motives have a signicant impact on human behavior outside stylized
laboratory environments.
3Gneezy and List (2006) found that an unexpected salary raise has only a short-lived positive eect
on work eort in a gift exchange game. Kube et al. (2012b) found that wage cuts have a detrimental and
persistent impact on productivity, while an equivalent wage increase has no eect. Cohn et al. (2009)
conducted a eld experiment in which wages are increased and found that workers who felt underpaid at
the baseline wage react to the wage increase strongly by raising eort, while workers who felt paid fairly at
the baseline wage do not increase their eort. Bellemare and Shearer (2009) found that providing a bonus
unrelated to past productivity in a eld experiment at a tree-planting rm has a signicant and positive
eect on productivity. Finally, in contrast to these experiments, where the generous worker treatment
is only in terms of higher wages or bonuses, Kube et al. (2012a) demonstrate that non-monetary gifts
have a much stronger impact on worker eort provision than monetary gifts.
1
by Dohmen et al. (2009). They analyzed survey data and showed that measures of
positively reciprocal dispositions of respondents in the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP) are signicantly correlated with higher wages and greater work eort.
Few studies have focused on the impact of perceived unfair treatment on worker
motivation and eort provision. An important exception is the interesting case study
by Krueger and Mas (2004) who document that labor strife at a U.S. tire production
site coincided with the production of substantially lower-quality tires, which arguably
resulted from the reduced eort and care of workers during the strife. This indicates that
harmful reciprocations are important in actual labor market settings.
This study uses a regression discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee
and Lemieux, 2010) to analyze the impact on job motivation of a legislative change
that curtailed the pensions of Dutch public sector employees born in 1950 and later,
but did not change those of public sector employees born in 1949 and earlier. Until
2006, contributions to sectoral early retirement schemes in the Netherlands were tax
deductible, which substantially boosted their nancial attractiveness. The legislative
change consisted of the abolishment of this favorable tax treatment. The abolition was not
limited to the public sector and also applied to workers in the private sector; however, the
major dierence between the sectors is that in the public sector the national government
is both the initiator of the pension reform and the employer in the sectoral bargaining
process. For the public sector we can therefore exploit the specic situation that, since the
government initiated the policy change, public sector employees born in 1950 are likely
to perceive their employer as directly responsible for the deterioration of their pensions.
The retrenchment of the pension rights of public sector employees constitutes a breach
of an informal agreement because the prospect of early retirement with high pension
benets was emphasized as an attractive job characteristic in the recruitment of public
sector workers since the second half of the 1970s. One could conjecture that such a
breach of an implicit contract triggers retaliation for deterrence in the employer-employee
relationship. We would therefore expect that the treated employees (i.e., those born just
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after December 31, 1949) are, on average, less motivated in their job than workers in
our control group, who are slightly older (i.e., born just before January 1, 1950) but
otherwise similar. Such a nding would be important by itself, since it would corroborate
the ndings of Krueger and Mas (2004).
Besides facing the breach of an informal contract, workers born in 1950 who compare
their pension rights to their own status quo before the policy change and to those who
still enjoy the older, more generous pension plan are likely to perceive the policy change
as unfair. If social motives drive negative reciprocity, we should expect that the nega-
tively reciprocal inclinations of workers catalyze the decline in job motivation after being
treated unfairly. We therefore hypothesize that worker reactions to `unfair' treatment are
heterogeneous and depend on their negative reciprocal inclinations: Among the treated
workers, those with strongly negatively reciprocal inclinations are expected to show a
stronger reaction to the unfair treatment than their treated colleagues who have only
weak negatively reciprocal inclinations.
We test our hypothesis using unique matched survey and administrative pension fund
data on male employees in the Dutch public sector who were born in either 1949 or 1950.4
The survey includes six questions validated in a controlled laboratory study by Perugini
et al. (2003) as measuring positive and negative reciprocity.5 We then compare employee
job motivation, a key determinant of work eort, in the treatment group, aected by the
retrenchment of pension rights (i.e., those born in 1950), with that in the control group
(i.e., those born in 1949) and assess whether the treatment eect depends on their degree
of negative reciprocity.6
4These data were also used by De Grip et al. (2012) who found a strong negative eect on the mental
health of treated workers, and by Montizaan and Vendrik (2012), who study the impact of a reduction in
pension wealth on life satisfaction and job satisfaction. Neither study considered heterogeneous eects
that depend on negatively reciprocal motivations.
5Perugini et al. (2003) performed comprehensive validation tests for their reciprocity scale and showed
that the measure for negative reciprocity predicts behavior in ultimatum games.
6Brown and Leigh (1996) investigated the process by which employee perceptions of a motivating
work environment are related to job involvement, eort and performance and found that a motivating
environment is related to job involvement, which in turn is strongly related to eort provision. Judge et
al. (2001) performed two meta-analyses on the relation between job satisfaction and job performance and
found a strong correlation between these two variables. Duncan et al. (1998) examined the relationship
between motivation and labor-market success using a sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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In our study, we show that workers with negatively reciprocal inclinations become less
motivated when they are in treated in a negative way. This results indicates that the
harmful eects of unfair treatment that previous studies have documented (e.g., Krueger
and Mas, 2004) are indeed driven by negatively reciprocal inclinations. More specically,
we nd that the exogenous decrease in pension benets is associated with a signicant
reduction in job motivation among negatively reciprocal employees. Job motivation is
lowest for treated individuals in the top quartile of the distribution of negative reciprocity.
Additional evidence strongly supports the idea that the causality runs from unfair treat-
ment to reduced job motivation, which is mediated by the perception of the degree of
unfairness and the strength of negatively reciprocal motives. For example, negatively
reciprocal treated workers who were closer born to the cut-o date (e.g., born in the rst
quarter of 1950) or who work in an organization with relatively many untreated colleagues
are the least motivated after the reform, indicating that they perceive the policy change
as particular unfair. Moreover, job motivation is lower among negatively reciprocal pub-
lic sector employees who work at central government institutions, most likely because
they hold their employer, the government that implemented the policy change, directly
accountable for the retrenchment of their pension rights.
Our ndings complement the literature in important ways. First, we exploit exoge-
nous variation in unfair worker treatment to shed light on the nature of the relationship
between unfair worker treatment and undesired worker response. Second, we use a di-
rect measure of reciprocal inclination to test whether the response of workers is brought
about by negative reciprocal motives, and we provide evidence for a causal link between
negatively reciprocal inclinations and reductions in job motivation. Finally, we show that
heterogeneity in negatively reciprocal inclinations leads to heterogeneity in the eort re-
sponse of workers who feel treated unfairly. These ndings are fundamental, since they
indicate that reciprocity is strongly driven by social motives.
(PSID) and found that motivational variables are strongly correlated with future earnings and human
capital investments (see also Bowles et al. (2001) for a discussion on the relevancy of motivational traits
for pay).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides more
details on the exogenous shock in the Dutch public sectors' pension system that generates
exogenous variation in the way workers are treated. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 presents the results and Section 5 ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Reform of the Public Sector's Pension System
Before discussing important details of the Dutch pension reform, we briey provide some
key features of the Dutch pension system. The Dutch pension system consists of three
pillars: 1) a public old age pension that is paid to all inhabitants aged 65 and older, 2)
a supplementary sectoral (or rm) pension, and 3) voluntary private pension plans. The
public old age pension is essentially a pay-as-you-go system in which current payments
are nanced by income taxes. Supplementary sectoral (or rm) pensions are of the de-
ned benet type and very wide spread, since participation in these schemes is generally
mandatory.7 Additional voluntary pension plans are oered by private insurance com-
panies. These pension plans typically take the form of savings plans that yield annuity
payments at retirement age and are less prevalent in the Netherlands.
Early retirement before the age of 65 is primarily made possible through the sectoral
pension system (i.e., the second pillar). Until 2006, contributions to the sectoral early
retirement schemes were tax deductible, which substantially boosted their nancial at-
tractiveness. This tax advantage amounted to about 25% of the net early retirement
allowance (Kooiman et al., 2004), which is partly a result of the progressive tax system
(Euwals et al., 2006). Typically, contributions to the sectoral pension schemes were such
that a public sector employee who had served for 40 years in the public sector could
retire at the age of 62 and three months at a replacement rate of 70%.8 As a result, early
7Most sectoral pension schemes are negotiated between unions and employer organizations at the
sector or rm level and are ocially laid down in collective agreements. In the public sector, both
employers and employees contribute to the pension fund.
8Until 2006, workers traditionally retired in the Netherlands when they achieved a replacement rate
of 70%.
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retirement became the social norm in the Netherlands. Approximately 80% of all workers
retired at the age of 62 or younger before 2006, and only 6% retired at the age of 65.9
In 2006, a reform in the Dutch pension system abolished the favorable tax deductibility
of the contributions to the sectoral early retirement schemes for all employees born in
1950 or later, but not for older cohorts. The government's intention was to provide
stronger incentives for younger cohorts to retire at an older age. Those born in 1950
and thereafter suered from a dramatic loss of early retirement options. Employees born
before 1950 who had been continuously employed in the public sector since April 1, 1997,
remained entitled to the generous old pension rights. The abolition of this favorable tax
treatment was not limited to the public sector and also applied to workers in the private
sector; however, the major dierence between the sectors is that in the public sector the
national government is both the initiator of the pension reform and the employer in the
sectoral bargaining process. This implies that public sector employees may hold their
own employer accountable for the drop in their pension rights.
In response to the abolishment of the favorable tax treatment of early retirement
schemes, the social partners in the public sector negotiated a new pension scheme that
became eective on January 1, 2006, for workers born in 1950 or later and those who
had not worked continuously in the public sector since April 1, 1997. This new scheme
is called `ABP Flexible Pension Scheme' and is carried out by the public sector's pen-
sion fund Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds (ABP).10 The new exible pension system
is characterized by i) a drop in pension benets, ii) an increase in pension contribution
payments to partly account for the drop in pension wealth resulting from i), and iii)
stronger incentives to continue working, generated by larger penalties on pension income
when retiring before commencement of the state pension at age 65 and by larger supple-
ments for later retirement.11 As a result, a typical employee born in 1950 or later with
9See Statistics Netherlands (2009).
10Note that the details of the pension scheme have been negotiated by the government and unions,
and that ABP only acts as a subcontractor.
11Furthermore, the eligibility age for pension benets was increased to 60 year, and workers can now
decide to continue working until their 70th birthday.
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40 years of tenure now only attains a replacement rate of 64% when retiring early at the
age of 62 years and three months, which is substantially lower than the replacement rate
of 70% that applied to them before the reform and still applies to workers born before
1950. To attain a replacement rate of 70%, workers who are aected by the reform have
to postpone retirement by one year and three months.
The ABP launched a campaign in the second half of 2005 to inform its members about
the introduction of the new pension system and to explain its nancial implications. A
special newsletter was devoted to the new pension system in which unions, employer orga-
nizations, and the ABP jointly explained the new exible pension scheme. All 1.2 million
ABP participants received a letter about the core characteristics of the new scheme, and
a complete electronic service package for public service employers was developed. There-
fore, one can assume that on January 1, 2006, most public sector employees born after
1949 and their employers were indeed familiar with the exogenous shock in their pension
rights.12
The strong dierential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950, came as
a surprise to public sector employees. Details of the new pension system were only
communicated in the second half of 2005, so that there was not much scope for workers
born on January 1, 1950, or later to fully oset the drop in their pension benets - that is,
by engaging in extra savings plans - because of the limited time horizon to retirement.13
12A comparison of expectations of the level of pension benets across the treatment and control groups
in the next section of this paper shows that respondents who are aected by the pension reform indeed
expect a signicantly lower replacement rate, and that the mean expected replacement rates are close to
the actual replacement rates of both groups.
13However, along with the abolishment of the favorable tax treatment, the government introduced the
Life Course Savings program in 2006. This program allows workers born in 1950 to build up tax-free
savings of approximately 14% of their annual earnings for seven years to nance early retirement at age
62 and three months. It is likely that only a very small fraction of these workers are able to save such a
high proportion of their earnings each year before retirement.
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3 Data
3.1 Data collection
We use survey data that we match to administrative data for male employees in the
public sector who were born in 1949 or 1950.14 The administrative data are from the
ABP. The data contain detailed information on individuals' pension rights at the ABP,
annual wage income, and tenure in the public sector.
The survey data were gathered after the introduction of the new pension system.
In January 2007, all 27,871 male public sector employees born in either 1949 or 1950
were invited to participate in our Internet survey by requesting their e-mail addresses.
The invitation letter, sent by surface mail, conveyed general information about the social
usefulness of the study but did neither reveal any information about the (motivation
for the) research question or the nature of our research strategy (e.g., we did not inform
potential participants that the invitation was only sent to public sector employees born in
1949 and 1950.) The letter also explicitly assures condentiality, so that respondents need
not fear repercussions from responding in a socially undesired manner. In March 2007,
we invited the 11,458 male public sector employees who had provided their contact details
to ll in the web-based survey. In total, 7,739 individuals completed the questionnaire
in 2007. References to the nature of our research question and research strategy were
avoided in the survey itself. In March 2008, we sent an e-mail invitation with a link to a
second web-based survey to all individuals who had logged on to the 2007 questionnaire.
This time 6,078 respondents completed the survey. In this second wave, we asked detailed
questions on reciprocal motivation, job motivation, and retirement expectations.
In our analyses, we exclude workers employed in certain burdensome occupations (e.g.,
remen and ambulance and police personnel), in which other retirement schemes are in
14The survey and administrative data are only available for these two specic birth years. We focus
on male employees because only a small, selective group of employees in these birth cohorts in the
Netherlands is female.
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place that allow early retirement without a substantial drop in income. In our main
analysis, we also restrict the sample to those employees who continuously worked in the
public sector since 1997 (thereby excluding 260 employees who are not eligible for the
pre-reform early retirement option even if they were born before 1950).15 Due to item
non-response for the variables of interest, the estimation sample is further reduced to
4,520 men, 2,373 of whom were born in 1950 and constitute the treatment group, while
the other 2,147 men, born in 1949, belong to the control group.
The dependent variable in our econometric analysis is a self-assessed measure of job
motivation. Respondents were asked to indicate how well the following statement applies
to them personally: `At times, I have diculties motivating myself in my job.' Answer
categories ranged from 1 (`applies perfectly to me') to 5 (`does not apply to me at all').
Our measure of reciprocity, one of the key explanatory variables in our analysis, is
based on the reciprocity scale developed and validated by Perugini et al. (2003). These
authors performed comprehensive validation tests and assessed the predictive power of
their reciprocity scale for the behavior of participants in ultimatum games in laboratory
experiments conducted in the United Kingdom and Italy. We include the six items
that have the highest loadings on the principal components for positive and negative
reciprocity and that were also included in the 2005 SOEP wave (see Dohmen et al., 2009)
for the behavioral validity of these questions). Respondents had to indicate on a ve-
point Likert scale (1 means `does not apply to me at all' and 5 means `applies perfectly
to me') how well they identied themselves with each of the following six statements: 1)
`If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it'; 2) `If I suer a serious wrong,
I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs'; 3) `If somebody puts
me in a dicult position, I will do the same to him/her'; 4) `I go out of my way to help
somebody who has been kind to me before'; 5) `If somebody oends me, I will oend
him/her back'; 6) `I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped
15In a robustness analysis we include the workers who did not work continuously in the public sector
since 1997.
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me before'. Statements 2), 3) and 5) refer to negative reciprocity; statements 1), 4)
and 6) concern positive reciprocity. We construct our measures of positive and negative
reciprocity by taking the arithmetic average of a respondent's answers to questions 2),
3), 5) and 1), 4), 6), respectively.16
A relevant concern is how well these survey questions measure the behavioral re-
ciprocal inclinations of the individuals in our sample. Various factors such as strategic
motives, self-serving biases, and lack of attention can induce respondents to distort or
unintentionally miss report their true reciprocal behavior (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
We are condent, however, that our measures are valid indicators of reciprocity, albeit
measured with error, for the following reasons. First, our reciprocity measures are ex-
perimentally validated. Second, Dohmen et al. (2009) showed that the survey measures
of reciprocity employed in this study are correlated with behavioral outcomes in a way
that is consistent with theoretical predictions. Third, previous research demonstrated
the validity of survey questions about preferences, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Fehr et
al., 2003; Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Falk and Zehnder, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011).
3.2 Descriptives
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the estimation sample (Column 1), and sep-
arately for the control group (Column 2) and treatment group (Column 3). Column 4
shows the p-values for the tests of the hypothesis that the treatment and control group
are the same. We do not observe signicant dierences in the average responses to each of
the six dierent reciprocity measures between the treatment and control groups, indicat-
ing that the change in pension rights did not aect self assessed reciprocal inclinations.
The sample averages for the three items that measure negative reciprocity range from
2.6 to 3.1 and are smaller than the averages for the items measuring positive reciprocity
16To avoid framing eects, the questions on job motivation and reciprocity were not placed directly
after questions on retirement expectations. The question on job motivation was placed after a block
of questions on training participation. The reciprocity questions were placed after a block of health
questions.
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(4.3 to 3.7). A substantial number of respondents report that the statements on positive
reciprocity apply to them perfectly, while respondents identify on average, less with the
statements on negative reciprocity. The variance within the negative reciprocity measures
is larger than within the positive reciprocity measures.17
Table 1 also reports summary statistics for our two reciprocity measures, which are
constructed by averaging agreement with the three statements concerning positive and
negative reciprocity respectively. Again, there are no dierences in reciprocal behav-
ior between the treatment and control groups according to these measures. There are
also no signicant between-group dierences in the other attributes used in our analyses
below, annual wage income, the number of years during which workers have built up
their pension, marital status, self-reported health status, educational attainment, and
the employment subsector.
Figure 1 plots local polynomial estimates of job motivation on birth date for the
treatment and control groups together, with 95% condence intervals, and reveals that
younger cohorts are more motivated, on average. Most importantly, there is a drop in job
motivation around the birth date that divides public sector employees into treatment and
control groups. This drop in job motivation for workers who were born just after 1949
suggests a causal impact of the retrenchment of pension rights on the level of job motiva-
tion. These regression lines indicate that the discontinuity around the birth date January
1, 1950, is signicant. Ascribing the reduction in job motivation to the retrenchment of
pension rights requires that the employees in our sample be aware of the drop in pension
rights brought about by the change in law. To verify this, we compare expectations of
the level of pension benets across the treatment and control groups with the following
question: `Suppose, you retired at the age of 62. How large will your pension benet
be as a percentage of your net wage income?' The average responses shown in Table 1
make it clear that respondents who are aected by the pension reform indeed expect a
17Reassuringly, the distributions of the answers to the six reciprocity questions exhibit very similar
patterns tho those of respondents' answers in the SOEP (Dohmen et al., 2009).
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signicantly lower replacement rate. The mean dierence in expected retirement benets
between the treatment and control groups amounts to ve percentage points, which is
remarkably close to the actual mean dierence between those groups (6%). Therefore,
we can reasonably conclude that employees are aware of the consequences of the new
pension system.
3.3 Self-selection
A relevant issue is whether our outcomes are aected by self-selection. We have to
acknowledge that non-respondents may have dierent characteristics than those who
lled in the questionnaire, and therefore our results may not be perfectly generalizable to
the entire male population of public sector workers born in 1949 or 1950. In this respect,
the natural experimental approach used here does not dier from the approach of other
studies that use non-experimental survey data. However, a much greater problem would
be when the non-response diers between the treatment and control group. For example,
when among the treated, those who feel the strongest about the reform, arguably the
most negatively reciprocal, do respond more often. In that situation, the similarity of
the two groups is no longer guaranteed, and the regression discontinuity design loses
its internal validity. We therefore examined in detail the similarity of the treated and
untreated respondents.
We are condent that the non-response does not dier between the treatment and
control group because of several reasons. First, as already mentioned before, the po-
tential participants were not informed about the nature of our question and research
strategy, and the invitation letter, as well as the survey itself, did not include references
to the pension reform. Second, we checked whether there were deviations in the survey
participation rate between the treatment and control groups. For each year, the dier-
ences in participation rates are extremely small. In 2007, 30.5% of all the workers in the
treatment group participated in the survey, versus 31.0% among the control group. In
12
2008, the survey participation rates were 21.6% for the treatment group and 22.2% for the
control group. Simple t-tests show that these small dierences in the participation rates
are statistically insignicant, with t-statistics of 0.97 in 2007 and 1.20 in 2008. Simple
probit analyses also conrm that selection into the survey in both survey waves was not
related to the treatment. These probit analyses include several control variables available
from the administrative data, such as work sector, contractual work hours, birth month,
and yearly wage (in logs). Third, we found no evidence in Table 1 that the treated and
untreated respondents dier in their observable characteristics. Both job and personal
characteristics are similar across the two groups and not signicantly dierent from each
other.
Finally, Table 1 showed that there are no signicant dierences in the average re-
sponses of both groups to each of the six dierent reciprocity measures and the averages
of the three statements concerning positive and negative reciprocity. Furthermore, Fig-
ures A1-A4 in the Appendix show that the distributions of the averages of our positive
and negative reciprocity indicators are strikingly similar for the treatment and control
groups. This indicates that negatively treated workers, who arguably feel the strongest
about the reform, did not more often respond to the questionnaire, and that our regression
discontinuity approach is internally valid.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Job Motivation, Treatment and Negative Reciprocity
We start our analysis by estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in which we
relate job motivation to a treatment dummy that takes the value one if the employee was
aected by the retrenchment in pension rights (i.e., born in 1950), and zero otherwise; the
measures of negative and positive reciprocity; two interaction terms between the measures
of reciprocity and the treatment dummy; and a set of control variables (including age,
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annual wage income (in logs), the number of years in which workers have built up their
pension, marital status, self-reported health status, educational attainment, and employ-
ment subsector). Since we have a sharp discontinuity in pension rights and observe only
a small age dierence between the treated and control groups, this is equivalent to a
regression discontinuity approach (Van der Klaauw, 2002). Our coecient of interest is
the coecient of the interaction between negative reciprocity and the treatment dummy.
This coecient captures dierential responses in job motivation by treated workers de-
pending on their negatively reciprocal inclinations. Column 1 of Table 2 shows that the
treatment eect is indeed heterogeneous with respect to reciprocal behavior. The coe-
cient of the interaction eect is negative and statistically signicantly dierent from zero,
indicating that the negative treatment eect is signicantly stronger for the negatively
reciprocal workers.18
An increase of one standard deviation in the negative reciprocity scale (0.79) reduces
the job motivation of treated workers by 0.101, equivalent to having an annual wage that
is 0.5% lower. We also nd, as can be expected, that the interaction between positive
reciprocity and the treatment variable has no eect on the level of job motivation. Table 2
shows that negative reciprocity generally reduces the job motivation of all workers signif-
icantly, while positive reciprocity has no signicant impact. Employees with bad health
and those who increased their pension savings in the previous year are less motivated
while job motivation is positively correlated with wage income and being married.
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2 shows that our key result, that the reduction in job motiva-
tion of workers whose pension rights are curbed depends on the level of their negatively
reciprocal inclinations, is robust to the inclusion of higher-order age polynomials. Column
5 further shows that this result is robust to the inclusion of interaction terms between
18We also estimated the impact of unfair treatment on job motivation for the dierent quartiles of
the distribution of negative reciprocity. The comparison of the treatment dummy across the dierent
quartiles conrms that the treatment eect is heterogenous with respect to reciprocal behavior: The
dierence in job motivation is highest and statistically signicant among treated workers in the upper
quartile of the negative reciprocity distribution, and lowest among the least negatively reciprocal treated
workers.
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our measures for negative or positive reciprocity and age.19 Table A1 in the Appendix
shows that this result is also robust to the estimation technique: Ordered probit estimates
that deal with the discreteness of job motivation lead to exactly the same conclusion.20
Furthermore, Table A2 in the Appendix shows that the interaction eect between the
three separate individual negative reciprocity items and the treatment dummy on job
motivation is signicant for all three items.21
4.2 Perceived Unfairness of Policy Change
Until now, we have implicitly presupposed that the perceived unfairness brought about
by the retrenchment in pension rights is the same among all treated workers. However,
there may be dierences in perceived unfairness. We would expect that those who feel
treated most unfairly among the negative reciprocal to react more strongly to the policy
change. Unfortunately, we do not have a direct measure of perceived unfairness, but
it is plausible to assume that workers who were born only shortly after the treatment
threshold perceive the policy change as more unfair; they compare their pension rights to
the rights of those born just a few days earlier but who still enjoy the older more generous
plan. Accordingly, we expect that strongly negatively reciprocal workers in this specic
group will be more demotivated than workers born later in 1950.
We test this conjecture by comparing the job motivation of workers born in dierent
quarters in 1950.22 The treatment group in Column 1 of Table 3 consists of workers who
19The policy has an impact only on the workers who choose the early retirement scheme. Because most
workers retired at the age of 62 or younger before 2006, they are indeed curtailed in their early retirement
plans. However, we included the expected retirement age and its interaction with negative reciprocity
in an additional analysis to control for early retirement preferences. We nd that the coecient of the
interaction between treatment and negative reciprocity is robust to the inclusion of these variables.
20The results are also robust to the use of a semi-nonparametric estimator for a series of generalized
models that nest the ordered probit model and thereby relaxes the distributional assumptions in that
model (see Stewart, 2004).
21In additional robustness checks we investigate whether our results are sensitive to the construction of
our reciprocity measures. We estimate ordered probit models, including alternative measures of negative
and positive reciprocity constructed based on principal component analysis on the six underlying items,
and nd that the interaction eect between negative reciprocity and the treatment group remains highly
signicant.
22We also checked whether the eect of the interaction between the treatment dummy and negative
reciprocity can be attributed to the seasonality of birth by performing additional estimations on a sample
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were born in the rst quarter of 1950 and the control group consists of those born in
the fourth quarter if 1949, while the treatment group in Column 2 consists of workers
born in the second, third or fourth quarter of 1950. The bandwidth selection in Column 1
corresponds to the optimal bandwidth which we derived by implementing the procedure of
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). This procedure enables the calculation of the optimal
bandwidth for regression discontinuity designs through the minimization of an expected
squared error loss criterion.23
Tabel 3 shows that our results are robust to applying a smaller bandwidth and con-
rms our expectation that negatively reciprocal workers born on or just after January 1,
1950, are more demotivated than workers born later in the year. The coecient of the
interaction term between negative reciprocity and the treatment variable is substantial
and signicant in Column 1, while the negative eect for workers born in later quarters
of 1950 is smaller (Column 2). However, the dierence between the coecients in both
regressions is not statistically signicant.24
It is also intuitive to assume that the extent to which colleagues in a worker's orga-
nization suer from the reform aects the perceived fairness of the policy change. Since
workers tend to compare the rewards of their eorts to those their colleagues receive, we
conjecture that treated employees suer more from the reform the higher the fraction of
untreated employees working in their organization (see also Fliessbach et al., 2007; Clark
and Senik, 2010; Gachter, et al., 2012). To construct a proxy for the degree of social com-
parison, we rely on administrative data to calculate for each public sector organization
of workers born in the rst quarter of 1949 or the rst quarter of 1950. We nd that the interaction eect
between reciprocity and the treatment dummy remains strongly signicant and therefore seasonality of
birth is not likely to be the main determinant of the signicant interaction eect.
23The idea behind the procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman is that the optimal bandwidth should
increase when the variance in outcomes increases at the cut-o, when the density of the forcing variable
(age) is smaller, or when the shapes of the curves on both sides of the cut-o becomes increasingly
symmetrical.
24It is conceivable that the treatment eect depends not only on reciprocal motivation, but also on the
assessment of workers of their own pension rights. We would expect that treated workers who expect
a relatively low pension may be more demotivated by the retrenchment of their pension rights. We
therefore have run separate regression analyses for workers who expect that their pension benet at age
62 are equal or above the median for each subgroup, and for those who expect their pension benets
to be below the median. We found indeed that job motivation is most reduced among treated negative
reciprocal workers who have low expectations of their pension rights.
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the fraction of untreated employees born in 1949 and the total number of workers in the
organization.25 We then run separate regressions for workers in organizations whose share
of untreated workers is below the median, and for those in organizations whose share of
untreated workers is at or above the median. Table 4 shows that the coecient of the
interaction term between the treatment dummy and the negative reciprocity measure is
almost twice as large for the group of workers who have a higher share of colleagues who
are unaected by the reform. This nding corroborates the hypothesis that the percep-
tion of being treated unfairly causes negatively reciprocal employees to retaliate against
their employer by providing less eort.
4.3 The Employer - Employee Relation
Employer accountability for unfair treatment is a pre-condition for the directed retaliation
of workers. We therefore expect negatively reciprocal workers who hold their employer
responsible for unfair treatment to purposefully retaliate against their employer. It is very
likely that public sector employees hold their employer responsible for the retrenchment of
pension rights, because the government, which is regarded as the public sector's corporate
management, initiated the pension reform by abolishing the favorable tax treatment.
This accountability in management is an important reason for focusing on public sector
employees. Nevertheless, it seems straightforward to conjecture that the extent to which
employees hold their employer responsible may dier across the dierent Dutch public
subsectors.26 Since the national government initiated the policy reform, it is plausible
to conjecture that civil servants who work for the national government most strongly
assign the blame for the unfair treatment directly to their own employer. Consequently,
25Unfortunately, we do not have administrative data on the age distribution of the total workforce in
organizations. We can therefore only look at the fraction of untreated employees who were born in 1949.
26The 15 subsectors are the following: the national government departments; defense (only civilian
personnel); provinces, municipalities; the judiciary; primary and secondary education, intermediate vo-
cational education; higher vocational education; universities; the research and scientic policy sector;
teaching hospitals; district water boards; water, energy and public utilities; voluntary members (includ-
ing ABP and public transport) and a remaining category.
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we expect that the treatment eect is greater among negatively reciprocal workers in the
government departments.
Estimating the impact of the reform separately for workers employed in the national
government departments and those in the remaining public subsectors, we nd that the
coecient of the interaction between the treatment term and our indicator for negative
reciprocity is much greater for employees in the government departments than in other
sectors, as a comparison of OLS estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 reveals. This
conrms the conjecture that employees who can directly associate the unfair treatment
to their own employer, show stronger negative reciprocal behavior through a reduction
in job motivation.
4.4 Robustness
4.4.1 Alternative Productivity Indicator
We have looked at job motivation as a proxy of work eort since it is dicult to measure
work eort directly. Alternatively, one can argue that reduced work eort should be
reected in reduced productivity and therefore aim for a direct assessment of the input of
negatively reciprocal individuals among the treated group on productivity. It is dicult,
however, to measure individual productivity in the public sector. Using the same data as
we use, De Grip et al. (2012) recently showed that the unexpected drop in pension rights
increases the likelihood of becoming depressed. Since depression aects productivity
by causing mistakes at work, faulty products as well as increased sickness absence (see
OECD, 2008), a mental health variable may serve as a useful alternative indicator for
productivity. Moreover, we can assume that workers who are more negatively reciprocal
and therefore have strong negative emotions when aected by the reform also become
more depressed.27 Column 1 of Table A3 in the Appendix reports the estimation results
27To measure mental health, De Grip et al. (2012) used the CES-D8 indicator of depression, which is
derived from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. The CES-D8 consists of eight items,
six of which are negatively phrased statements that reect the presence of depressive symptoms, and two
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of a lineair probability model regression on the depression indicator. We nd that workers
in the treatment group who are strongly negatively reciprocal are indeed more depressed
(the coecient of the interaction dummy equals 0.012, with a standard error of 0.005)
than less negatively reciprocal workers, thus conrming our results on job motivation.
4.4.2 Workers with Career Breaks
The results of further robustness checks shown in Table A4 in the Appendix buttress our
ndings. This analysis includes workers with career breaks after April 1997. Although
it is conceivable that these worker's career interruptions were caused by unobserved in-
dividual characteristics that may also be related to reciprocal behavior, the inclusion of
these workers introduces an additional treatment group. Remember that the legislative
change also curtailed the pensions of those born in 1949 and before if they did not work
continuously in the public sector since April, 1997. Column 1 presents estimation results
only for workers born in 1949. The treatment dummy equals one for workers born in 1949,
but not entitled to the old pension rights since they did not work continuously since April
1997, whereas the dummy is zero for all workers in 1949 who remain entitled. The esti-
mation results show a signicant and negative coecient of the interaction between the
treatment variable and negative reciprocity. Therefore, for this specic treatment group
as well, we nd that primarily negatively reciprocal workers with curtailed pension rights
are strongly demotivated.
Column 2 of Table A4 contains estimation results for the full 1949 and 1950 sample
and includes two treatment dummy variables. The rst treatment dummy equals one for
workers born in 1949 and not entitled to the old pension rights, and zero otherwise. The
positively phrased statements that reect the absence of depressive symptoms. To create the variable
used in our analyses, we rst dichotomized (yes/no) responses and reversed coding of the positively
phrased items to achieve a count variable from 0 to 8, with higher values suggesting worsening depressive
symptoms. In the next step, we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether workers are depressed.
Following De Grip et al. (2012) we used the suggested score of 4 and above to indicate probable clinical
depression. Validation studies have shown that this cut-o score for the CES-D8 scale is optimal for
determining clinical depression, and is equivalent to the standard cut-o point of 16 for the full CES-D
scale (Blazer et al., 1991; Andresen et al., 1994; Beekman et al., 1995; Steck, 2000; Reyes-Gibby et al.,
2002). Using lower cut-o scores will lead to a substantial over-estimation of the number of depressed
individuals, while the gains of applying a higher cut-o are limited (Beekman et al., 1995).
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second treatment dummy equals one if the workers were born in 1950, and zero if born in
1949. The estimation results show that both interactions between the treatment dummy
variables and negative reciprocity are negative and signicantly dierent from zero. The
negatively reciprocal workers of the 1949 treatment group appear to be slightly more
demotivated than those who are in the 1950 treatment group; however, the dierence
between the two coecients is insignicant at the 5% level.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that reciprocity is an important determinant of job motivation. Using
a natural experiment, we nd that a decrease in pension rights is associated with lower
job motivation among negatively reciprocal employees. Moreover, negatively reciprocal
workers born in the rst three months of 1950 are more demotivated than those born
later in the year, plausibly because the former perceive the dierential tax treatment as
more unfair because their age hardly diers from that of those not aected by the reform.
Moreover, we observe that the coecient of the interaction term between the treatment
dummy and negative reciprocity is substantial larger for workers confronted with a higher
share of colleagues with similar characteristics who are not covered by the reform. We
also nd that negatively reciprocal workers employed in the national government, and
who can this directly associate their unfair treatment to their own employer, have lower
job motivation than those employed in other public subsectors. Our results are robust to
the use of alternative estimation methods and dierent indicators of productivity.
Our ndings complement earlier experimental evidence. In accordance with an ulti-
matum game, the drop in motivation can be interpreted as the sanctioning of unkind or
hostile actions (e.g. Guth et al., 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Our evidence shows
that negatively reciprocal individuals not only sanction actions they perceive as unkind
or hostile in laboratory settings, but also behave similarly when they feel treated unfairly
by their employers. Consequently, the intended eects of pension reforms that aim to
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increase labor force participation can be distorted by the decreasing job motivation of
negatively reciprocal workers who feel unfairly treated. Therefore, it is crucial to think of
reform designs that provide less scope for being perceived as unfair by particular groups.
In the specic example of tax legislation aecting pension rights, an alternative design
that entails smaller discontinuous dierences in pension rights would arguably cause less
disruption in terms of negatively reciprocal responses.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Entire Born in Born in P-value
sample 1949 1950
Take revenge for a serious wrong 3.06 3.06 3.06 0.78
(1.04) (1.04) (1.05)
Retaliate for being put in a dicult position 2.54 2.54 2.54 0.89
(0.85) (0.84) (0.86)
Reciprocate insult with an insult 2.60 2.60 2.62 0.85
(0.91) (0.90) (0.91)
Reciprocate a favor 4.29 4.31 4.27 0.08
(0.64) (0.63) (0.64)
Exert eort to help somebody who is kind 4.11 4.11 4.11 0.80
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62)
Undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful before 3.73 3.73 3.72 0.15
(0.70) (0.69) (0.71)
Negative reciprocity (averaged) 2.73 2.74 2.73 0.96
(0.79) (0.78) (0.79)
Positive reciprocity (averaged) 4.04 4.05 4.04 0.13
(0.51) (0.50) (0.51)
Expected retirement benet at age of 62 (in % of net present wage) 69.02 71.66 66.62 0.00
(11.67) (11.67) (11.14)
Extra pension savings in previous year (1 if savings increased) 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.00
(0.43) (0.41) (0.44)
Yearly wage (in euros) 53,132 53,132 53,131 0.30
(16,420) (15,957) (16,938)
Log size of organization 7.13 7.13 7.13 0.59
(1.78) (1.79) (1.77)
Marital status (1 if married) 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.08
(0.28) (0.27) (0.29)
Bad health (self reported on 5-point Likert scale) 2.06 2.07 2.05 0.45
(0.72) (0.72) (0.72)
Number of observations 4,520 2,147 2,373
Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample averages. The measure of negative reciprocity is the
individual's agreement to the three statements on the willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate for
being put in a dicult position and to respond to an insult with an insult. The measure of positive reciprocity reects
the agreement to statements on the willingness to return a favor; to exert eort to somebody who was kind; and to
undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful before. Both measures are based on the average of the three
underlying items. Answers for the six reciprocity questions are on a ve-point Likert scale between 1 to 5 with 1 meaning
`does not apply to me at all' and 5 means `applies perfectly to me'. The expected retirement benet at age of 62 is based
on the following survey question: `Suppose you would retire at the age of 62. How large would your pension benet be
in percentage of your net wage income?' The yearly wage income is based on administrative data of the public sector's
pension fund.
26
Table 2
Negative reciprocity, treatment and job motivation: OLS estimates
Dependent variable: Job motivation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.165**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.082)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.033
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.130)
Negative reciprocity -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.037
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.113)
Positive reciprocity -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.011
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.176)
Treatment dummy 0.427 0.300 0.301 0.272 0.433
(0.272) (0.278) (0.278) (0.285) (0.545)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log yearly wage 0.202** 0.202** 0.203** 0.204** 0.202**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
Log size of organization 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Marital status 0.100* 0.103* 0.104* 0.104* 0.104*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Bad health -0.408*** -0.407*** -0.407*** -0.407*** -0.407***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.121** -0.143 0.007 0.016
(0.056) (0.120) (0.329) (0.471)
Age2 0.011 -0.201
(0.054) (0.436)
Age3 0.070
(0.143)
Interaction age and negative reciprocity -0.038
(0.072)
Interaction age and positive reciprocity -0.008
(0.111)
Constant 2.255** 2.443** 2.446** 2.446** 2.238*
(0.969) (0.972) (0.972) (0.973) (1.213)
Observations 4,520 4,520 4,520 4,520 4,520
R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099
The measures of negative and positive reciprocity used in the estimations are constructed by taking the average
of the three underlying items. Additional control variables in the estimations are: educational levels; sector
xed eects. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Table 3
Treatment eect on job motivation: Results for dierent birth cohorts
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Job motivation I 1950 vs IV 1949 II-IV 1950 vs IV 1949
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity -0.189** -0.141**
(0.081) (0.070)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.087 0.020
(0.130) (0.111)
Negative reciprocity -0.066 -0.072
(0.061) (0.061)
Positive reciprocity -0.023 -0.026
(0.098) (0.099)
Treatment dummy 0.723 0.227
(0.546) (0.469)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.004)
Log yearly wage 0.115 0.143
(0.171) (0.124)
Log size of organization 0.004 0.031
(0.030) (0.021)
Marital status -0.070 0.159**
(0.129) (0.081)
Bad health -0.474*** -0.400***
(0.047) (0.032)
Constant 3.831** 2.787*
(1.905) (1.464)
Observations 1,124 2,199
R-squared 0.129 0.109
OLS estimates. In Column 1, workers born in the rst quarter of 1950 are compared to workers
in the control group who were born in the fourth quarter of 1949. Column 2 compares workers
born in the second, third or fourth quarter of 1950 with those born in the fourth quarter of 1949.
Additional control variables in both estimations are: educational levels; sector xed eects.
Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Table 4
Treatment eect on job motivation: social comparisons
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Job motivation Percentage untreated Percentage untreated
colleagues colleagues
above median under median
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity -0.180*** -0.097*
(0.062) (0.058)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.040 0.015
(0.096) (0.089)
Negative reciprocity -0.091** -0.092**
(0.043) (0.045)
Positive reciprocity 0.041 -0.051
(0.067) (0.069)
Treatment dummy 0.508 0.042
(0.419) (0.379)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.001 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Log yearly wage 0.159 0.232**
(0.133) (0.116)
Log size of organization -0.014 0.027
(0.021) (0.022)
Marital status 0.138 0.088
(0.092) (0.077)
Bad health -0.354*** -0.455***
(0.034) (0.031)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.097 -0.153**
(0.082) (0.077)
Constant 2.716* 2.672**
(1.452) (1.325)
Observations 2,205 2,315
R-squared 0.085 0.123
All columns show results which are based on OLS estimates. We use administrative data on the total number
of workers in the organization in which each employee is working to construct proxies for the incidence of social
comparisons in the organization. We determine whether treated workers who were born in 1950 are working in an
organization in which the group of untreated workers who were born in 1949 is comparatively large (percentage
untreated above or under median). Additional control variables in the estimations are: educational levels; sector
xed eects. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Table 5
Treatment eect on job motivation: Heterogenous sector eects
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Job motivation National Other
government sectors
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity -0.263*** -0.094**
(0.096) (0.047)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.038 -0.018
(0.146) (0.072)
Negative reciprocity -0.063 -0.096***
(0.072) (0.034)
Positive reciprocity 0.086 -0.034
(0.110) (0.053)
Treatment dummy 0.666 0.190
(0.619) (0.312)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund 0.005 -0.005*
(0.007) (0.003)
Log yearly wage 0.196 0.267***
(0.191) (0.091)
Log size of organization 0.014 -0.008
(0.030) (0.014)
Marital status 0.038 0.120*
(0.130) (0.066)
Bad health -0.369*** -0.419***
(0.053) (0.025)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.250** -0.095
(0.124) (0.063)
Constant 1.673 2.009**
(2.139) (1.005)
Observations 961 3,559
R-squared 0.095 0.099
OLS estimates. Educational levels are included as control variables. Standard
errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Figure 1 Job motivation
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This gure presents a local polynomial smooth of job motivation on birth date with a 95% condence interval, using a
Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth used for the kernel function corresponds to the optimal bandwidth derived
from the Imbens and Kalyanaraman procedure (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Job motivation is based on the following
5-level Likert item: `At times, I have diculties to motivate myself for my job'. Answers categories ranged form 1 (`does
applies perfectly to me') to 5 (`does not apply to me at all'). Our sample consists of two birth years where workers born in
1949 are entitled to the old pension rules and workers born in 1950 are subject to the new pension rules. The vertical line
in the gure marks the threshold which divides the control from the treatment group.
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Appendix
Table A1
Negative reciprocity, treatment and job motivation: Ordered Probit estimates
Dependent variable: Job motivation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.164**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.080)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.063
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.127)
Negative reciprocity -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.040
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.110)
Positive reciprocity 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.060
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.172)
Treatment dummy 0.464* 0.342 0.343 0.324 0.563
(0.265) (0.271) (0.271) (0.277) (0.532)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log yearly wage 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.227***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Log size of organization 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Marital status 0.093 0.096* 0.096* 0.096* 0.096*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Bad health -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.396***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.117** -0.145 -0.047 0.107
(0.055) (0.117) (0.320) (0.460)
Age2 0.014 -0.124
(0.053) (0.424)
Age3 0.046
(0.139)
Interaction age and negative reciprocity -0.038
(0.070)
Interaction age and positive reciprocity -0.030
(0.108)
Observations 4,520 4,520 4,520 4,520 4,520
The measures of negative and positive reciprocity used in the estimations are constructed by taking the average
of the three underlying items. Additional control variables in the estimations are: educational levels; sector
xed eects. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Table A2
Separate negative reciprocity components, treatment and job motivation:
Dependent variable: Job motivation (1) (2) (3)
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity component -0.084*** -0.039* -0.072***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.023)
Negative reciprocity component 2 -0.026
(0.023)
Negative reciprocity component 3 -0.163***
(0.021)
Negative reciprocity component 5 -0.093***
(0.019)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity -0.036 -0.053 -0.034
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Positive reciprocity -0.014 0.015 -0.003
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Treatment dummy 0.258 0.182 0.206
(0.275) (0.269) (0.271)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log yearly wage 0.234*** 0.189** 0.207**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
Log size of organization 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Marital status 0.085 0.104* 0.098*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Bad health -0.413*** -0.405*** -0.409***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.116** -0.120** -0.124**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Constant 2.191** 2.885*** 2.599***
(0.996) (0.993) (0.998)
Observations 4,539 4,533 4,526
R-squared 0.090 0.102 0.095
OLS estimates. Column 1 shows the results for the statement `If I suer a serious wrong, I will
take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs', Column 2 for `If somebody puts me
in a dicult position, I will do the same to him/her' and Column 3 for `If somebody oends
me, I will oend him/her back'. Additional control variables in the estimations are: educational
levels; sector xed eects. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10:
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Table A3
Negative reciprocity, treatment and mental health
(1)
VARIABLES Depressed
Interaction treatment and negative reciprocity 0.022***
(0.008)
Interaction treatment and positive reciprocity 0.009
(0.012)
Negative reciprocity -0.009
(0.006)
Positive reciprocity 0.016*
(0.009)
Treatment dummy -0.066
(0.051)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund 0.001
(0.000)
Log yearly wage -0.008
(0.016)
Log size of organization 0.001
(0.003)
Marital status -0.044***
(0.011)
Bad health 0.068***
(0.004)
Age (in days divided by 365) 0.012
(0.010)
Constant -0.063
(0.172)
Observations 4,431
R-squared 0.076
OLS estimates. The dependent variable is based on the CES-D8 indicator of depression
which is derived from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale The CES-D8
consists of eight items, six of which are negatively phrased statements that reect the
presence of depressive symptoms, and two positively phrased statements that reect the
absence of depressive symptoms. To create the variable used in our analyses, we rst
dichotomized (yes/no) responses and reversed the coding of positively phrased items to
achieve a count variable from 0 to 8, with higher values suggesting worsening depressive
symptoms. In the next step, we constructed a dummy variable indicating whether workers
are depressed. Following De Grip et al. (2012) we used the suggested score of 4 and
above to indicate probable clinical depression. Educational levels are included as control
variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  < 0:10.
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Table A4
Treatment eect on job motivation: Workers with career breaks
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Job motivation 1949 1949 and 1950
Interaction treatment 1949 and negative reciprocity -0.228** -0.215*
(0.112) (0.113)
Interaction treatment 1949 and positive reciprocity 0.043 0.040
(0.151) (0.153)
Interaction treatment 1950 and negative reciprocity -0.122***
(0.042)
Interaction treatment 1950 and positive reciprocity -0.022
(0.064)
Negative reciprocity -0.082*** -0.094***
(0.031) (0.031)
Positive reciprocity -0.005 -0.001
(0.047) (0.048)
Treatment dummy 1949 0.550 0.480
(0.656) (0.663)
Treatment dummy 1950 0.292
(0.277)
Number of years contributed to the pension fund -0.002 -0.004*
(0.004) (0.002)
Log yearly wage 0.277** 0.176**
(0.118) (0.083)
Log size of organization -0.028 0.001
(0.020) (0.014)
Marital status 0.042 0.117**
(0.084) (0.057)
Bad health -0.393*** -0.407***
(0.031) (0.022)
Age (in days divided by 365) -0.065 -0.100*
(0.078) (0.055)
Constant 2.025 2.714***
(1.316) (0.918)
Observations 2,305 4,720
R-squared 0.090 0.099
OLS estimates. Column 1 presents estimation results for workers born in 1949. The
treatment dummy equals one for workers who are not entitled to the old pension
rights since they did not work in the public sector continuously since April 1997, and
zero for workers who remain entitled to the old pension rights. Column 2 contains
estimation results for the 1949 cohort, as well as the 1950 cohort. The model includes
two treatment dummy variables. The rst treatment dummy equals one for workers
born in 1949 and who are not entitled to the old pension rights and zero otherwise.
The second treatment dummy equals one if workers were born in 1950 and zero for
those born in 1949. Additional control variables in estimations are: educational levels;
sector xed eects. Standard errors are in parentheses.    < 0:01;  < 0:05;  <
0:10
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Figure A1 Distribution average negative reciprocity: Treatment
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Figure A3 Distribution average positive reciprocity: Treatment
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Figure A4 Distribution average positive reciprocity: Control
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